Employment issues in Sub-Saharan Africa by Vandemoortele, Jan
AUGUST 1991 
SPECIAL PAPER FOURTEEN 




AFRICAN ECONOMIC RESEARCH CONSORTIUM 
CONSORTIUM POUR LA RECHERCHE ECONOMIQUE EN AFRIQUE 
ISAM 16-030 
•./o •> c: " : 
L I B R A R Y 
28 MAY 1992 
Inst i tute of 
D e v e l o p m e n t S t u d i e s 
Employment issues in 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
IDS Information Resource Unit 
University of Sussex 
Falmer, Brighton B N 1 9RE, UK 
P L E A S E R E T U R N B Y 
Other Publications in the AERC Special Papers Series 
Supply Response in the Context of Structural Adjustment in Sub-
Saharan Africa by T. Ademola Oyejide, Special Paper 1. 
Structure, Development and Adaptation by Tony Killick, Special 
Paper 2. 
The African Debt Crisis by Joshua E. Greene and Mohsin S. Khan, 
Special Paper 3. 
Internal Debt Management in Africa by Alan R. Roe with Jonathan 
Griggs, Special Paper 4. 
Graduate Training in Economics for Africans: A Joint Report by S. 
Ibi Ajayi, H. Jacques Pegatienan and Mohamed Mukras, Special 
Paper 5. 
Graduate Training in Economics in Nigeria and Ghana by S. Ibi 
Ajayi, Special Paper 6. 
Graduate Training in Economics in Francophone West and Central 
Africa by H. Jacques Pegatienan, Special Paper 7. 
The State of Graduate Training in Economics in Eastern and Southern 
Africa by Mohamed S. Mukras, Special Paper 8. 
A Strategy for Graduate Training in Economics for Africans by 
Jeffrey C. Fine, Special Paper 9. 
Graduate Training in Economics with Particular Reference to 
Anglophone Africa (Except Nigeria) by Mohamed S. Mukras, 
Special Paper 10. 
Nigeria s Graduate Training Opportunities in Economics by S. Ibi 
Ajayi and Mike Kwanashie, Special Paper 11. 
Trade Policy and Promotion in Sub-Saharan Africa by William M. 
Lyakurwa, Special Paper 12. 
Macroeconomic Policies and Long-Term Growth: A Conceptual and 
Empirical Review by Mohsin S. Khan and Delano Villanueva, 
Special Paper 13. 
Employment issues in 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Jan Vandemoortele* 
United Nations Development Programme 
AERC Special Paper 14 
Initiatives Publishers, Nairobi 
August 1991 
'The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect 
those of his employer. Until the end of 1990. the author was a member of the ILO/JASPA 
team. 
© African Economic Research Consortium, 1991 
Published by Initiatives Publishers, 
a division of Initiatives Ltd., 
P.O. Box 69313, Nairobi, Kenya, 
(Tel. 744047, 744095, Fax 743995) 
for the African Economic Research Consortium, 
P.O. Box 47543, Nairobi, Kenya 
Printed by English Press Ltd., 
P.O. Box 30127, Nairobi, Kenya 
Cataloguing in Publication Data 
Employment Issues in Sub-Saharan Africa /Jan 
Vandemoortele.—Nairobi, Kenya, Initiatives 
Publishers, Initiatives Ltd., 1991. 
(African Economic Research Consortium 
(AERC) Special Papers Series; no. 14) 
ISBN 9966-42-026-6 
Contents 
List of Tables vi 
List of Figures vii 
I Introduction 1 
II Population and labour force 3 
III Modern-sector employment 7 
IV Informal-sector employment 10 
V Rural employment 14 
VI Unemployment 18 
VII Wages and salaries 25 
VIII Employment projections for the 1990s 31 
IX Conclusions 34 
Notes 37 
References 40 
List of fables 
1. Labour force projection 5 
2. Composition of rural household income in selected countries 15 
3. Urban unemployment rates in selected countries 18 
4. Urban unemployment rates by age in selected countries 20 
5. Unemployment rates by level of education in selected countries 21 
6. The ratio of highest to lowest starting salary in selected 
civil services 27 
7. Employment projections forSub-Saharan Africa (millions) 31 
List of figures 
1. Activity rate by location and gender 4 
2. Activity rate by gender and level of education 4 
3. Workforce by employment status 12 
4. Real cocoa producer prices in selected countries 16 
5. Youth and adult unemployment rates 19 
6. Youth unemployment rates by level of education 22 
7. Growth in school enrolment by level of education 23 
8. Real starting salary in the civil service by grade in 1985 26 
9. Real starting salary in the civil service of Sierra Leone 28 
10. Real minimum trends in selected countries 28 
11. Sectoral employment structure 32 
I. Introduction 
Why is it important to consider labour-market issues in an era of structural 
adjustment? The answer is two-fold. First, the structure and behaviour of the 
labour market determine to a large extent the way in which the entire eco-
nomic system will respond to policy changes and incentives (through labour 
mobility, wage flexibility, productivity gains, etc.). Second, the impact of 
those policy changes on the labour market will determine whether the adjust-
ment process will be socially and politically sustainable or not. The 
disregard of the social impact—particularly on employment and labour 
incomes—was often at the root of the failure of the adjustment process 
during the 1980s. 
Despite this essential role, relatively little is known about the structure and 
behaviour of labour markets in the region. Without hard data, existing 
reform programmes usually conjecture a neoclassical behaviour of the labour 
market. Indeed, it is not uncommon to find in the literature assertions like " . . 
. experience suggests tha t . . . governments should resist interfering in labour 
markets. If left alone, they work well".1 Before we can move from economic 
analysis to pragmatic prescription, we need to have a better understanding of 
how labour markets really operate and why they do so. It would be 
ineffective and counter-productive to fabricate prescriptions by merely 
fitting facts and figures to predispositions of ideology and economic dogmas. 
Economic fairy tales about the labour-market are of little use to policy-
makers. Hence, there is an urgent need for enhanced country-specific labour 
market research to improve the design and appropriateness of the new 
generation of structural adjustment programmes. 
The objective of this paper is to present an overview of the major labour-
market adjustments that have occurred during the 1980s in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. In so doing, the paper will indicate the challenges that lie ahead and 
suggest areas and issues for further investigation. The topics discussed at the 
regional level will present a structured framework for analysis in country-
specific research. Because of the wide variety of labour-market features 
among African countries, however, it is likely that the results of country 
studies will sometimes contradict the regional characterization given in this 
paper. 
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The structure of the paper is as follows: Section II presents the labour 
force projections for the 1990s. It draws attention to the salient feature of 
increased female labour force participation over time. Section III reviews 
recent employment trends in the modern sector and discusses the issue of 
public-sector employment. Sections IV and V deal with employment in the 
informal and rural sectors respectively. Caution is expressed regarding the 
widespread belief that unemployed youth can easily be settled in productive 
self-employment in the informal sector. In the rural areas, the growing 
importance of non-farm activities is a noticeable development. Section VI 
discusses the issue of mounting unemployment and identifies the 
unemployed. Section VII assesses real wage and salary trends. It points to 
the dangers of using aggregate wage and salary data. Section VIII makes 
employment projections for the 1990s. It shows how the informal and rural 
sectors will continue to play the role of ultimate labour sponges. In Section 
IX, we reiterate the premise that the success and failure rates of adjustment 
programmes will critically depend on their correct assessment of the 
structure and behaviour of the labour market. 
II. Population and labour force 
The population of sub-Saharan Africa is currently estimated at 
approximately 500 million people. It is projected to grow at 3.2 per cent a 
year during the 1990s.2 An estimation of the size of the regional labour force 
requires information about average activity rates. Activity rates in Sub-
Saharan Africa display the following characteristics: (i) they are higher in 
rural areas compared to urban centres, and (ii) they are markedly higher for 
males than for females—except in the age-bracket 15-19 because of higher 
male enrolment in secondary education. However, the gender bias differs 
according to the location. In rural areas, the activity rate is highest for 
females, while the opposite is true in urban areas. Figure 1 depicts activity 
rates for males (M) and females (F) by rural and urban location for three 
countries, namely Cote d'lvoire (1985), Kenya (1986), and Zimbabwe 
(1986/87). The graph confirms that activity rates are highest in rural areas, 
that urban females are considerably less economically active than urban 
males, and that this gender bias is reversed in rural areas.3 
Recent population censuses and labour-force surveys indicate that the 
average rural and urban activity rates for the working-age population 
approximate 80 and 65 per cent, respectively.4 However, they also 
demonstrate noticeable changes over time. Indeed, the data show marked 
increases in activity rates.5 In Zimbabwe, for instance, the overall activity 
rate of the working-age population increased by 7 percentage points between 
1982 and 1986/87.6 A closer analysis of the evidence reveals that the rise 
stemmed essentially from higher participation of urban women. The two 
labour-force surveys undertaken in Kenya show a striking increase in 
economic activity of urban women. Between 1977/78 and 1986, their labour-
force participation rate increased from 39 to 56 per cent. The activity rate of 
urban men and the rural working age population, on the other hand, 
remained virtually constant.7 In Mauritius, the female labour-force 
participation rate expanded from 20 per cent in 1972 to 26 and 34 per cent in 
1983 and 1987 respectively.8 
The increased number of female labour-force recruits in urban areas arises 
from two main factors. First, education is positively correlated with labour-
force participation. This is illustrated in Figure 2. It suggests that the level of 
education determines, to a large extent, the activity rate for urban women.9 
* 
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Figure 1 Activity rate by location and gender 
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Figure 2 Activity rate by gender and level of education 
Urban Kenya, 1986 
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Sourcet CB8 (1986) 
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Since there is virtual full participation in the prime age groups for urban 
males and rural workers, education has almost no influence on their activity 
rate. The second factor that has a bearing on female activity rates is the pro-
cess of labour market informalization, especially in urban areas. Indeed, the 
increased activity rate of women stems from the implementation of survival 
mechanisms10 at the household level. In coping with deteriorating income 
trends in the urban sector, households increase their activity rate, particularly 
those of their female members. 
The urban female activity rate is expected to rise further in the future be-
cause of the interplay of the above-mentioned factors. Despite the setbacks 
in the field of primary education in recent years, female enrolment has 
increased considerably.11 The average number of years of education received 
by the female labour force in urban Kenya increased from 3.4 to 5.3 between 
1969 and 1986. In 1983, the average women on the Mauritian labour market 
had attained 6.2 years of education, which came close to the male average of 
7.1 years. The process of labour-market informalization, on the other hand, 
is unlikely to be reversed in the near future, compelling urban women to 
continue to increase their activity rate. Moreover, as the natural population 
growth gains importance vis-a-vis the rural-to-urban migration, the 
masculinity ratio in urban Africa is gradually approaching equilibrium. 
Hence, women will represent a growing share of the newcomers in the urban 
labour market. 
For these reasons, it is estimated that the number of female entrants in the 
Sub-Saharan urban labour market will increase rapidly in the future. It is 
conservatively estimated that the overall urban activity rate will increase 
from 65 per cent in 1990 to 67 per cent in 2000. The estimated regional 
labour force for those years is given in Table 1. 
Table 1 Labour force projections (millions) 






Rural 349.9 430.4 80.5 2.1% 
Urban 144.9 250.6 105.7 5.6% 
Total 494.8 681.0 186.2 3.2% 
Working-age population 263.3 364.7 101.4 3.3% 
Activity rate 
Rural 80% 80% - -
Urban 65% 67% - -
Labour force 
Rural 149.0 184.4 35.4 2.2% 
Urban 50.1 89.9 39.8 6.0% 
Total 199.1 274.3 75.2 3.3% 
Source: United Nations (1989) and own estimations. 
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The regional labour force is estimated at approximately 200 million in 
1990. It is projected to increase at 3.3 per cent per annum over the next ten 
years.12 Hence, the Sub-Saharan economies will have to generate an average 
of 7.5 million new jobs every year to absorb all labour force recruits during 
the 1990s. The urban labour-force in particular will grow exponentially at an 
average rate of 6 per cent a year. In the years to come, the urban labour 
market will have to absorb more than half of all the labour-force recruits. 
III. Modern-sector employment 
The modern sector employed only 10 per cent of the regional labour force in 
1980.13 Moreover, the rate of wage employment growth slowed down 
notably during the 1980s. Wage employment is reported to have fallen in 
absolute terms in several Sub-Saharan African countries, including the 
Central African Republic (-33.6% in 1980-1986), Cote d'lvoire (-15.0% in 
1980-1989), the Gambia (-27.5% in 1979-1986), Niger (-24.2% in 1981-
1988), Zaire (-8.5% in 1980-1984), and Zambia (-5.2% in 1980-1989). In 
Togo, private-sector wage employment declined by 7 per cent in the period 
1980-1988. It fell by one-fifth in Tanzania between 1979 and 1984. In 
Niger, employment in private and public enterprises dropped by 22.7 per 
cent between 1979 and 1989. It plunged by 28.2 per cent in Cote d'lvoire 
between 1980 and 1989. In the Central African Republic, it plummeted by 
23.7 per cent in a time span of just two years between 1985-1987. 
A deceleration in modem sector employment has indeed been observed in 
several countries. The public sector was not immune to this generalized 
slow-down in wage employment. According to recent ILO data, public 
sector employment growth in eight Sub-Saharan African countries 
decelerated from a weighted average of 7.3 per cent a year in the period 
1975-1980 to 2.4 per cent in the quinquennium 1980-1985.14 Likewise, a 
World Bank study reports that government employment growth declined 
from an average rate of 4.0 per cent per annum between 1981 and 1983 to 
2.4 per cent in the period 1984-1986.15 In Niger, the rate of expansion of the 
civil service decelerated from 9.7 per cent in the period 1982-1984 to 3.8 per 
cent in 1987-1989. In Cote d'lvoire it decelerated from 8.6 per cent in the 
period 1980-1983 to 1.8 per cent in 1986-1989. In some extreme cases, 
governments have been forced to retrench thousands of public-sector 
workers. 
The argument is often voiced that overstaffing in the public sector consti-
tutes a major destabilizing factor of the fiscal position because the public 
sector wage bill is progressively claiming a larger proportion of government 
revenue—hence the advice to retrench thousands of civil servants. But 
overmanning is an empirical question and should not become a new article 
of faith in economic analysis.16 
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Moreover, many of the ambitious retrenchment programmes did not reach 
their target. Most governments consider the dismissal of civil servants as the 
ultimate step in solving the public-sector employment problem. Instead, 
many have limited their action to a less controversial sequence of 
measures,17 including a salary freeze, cancellation of vacant budgetary posts, 
lowering of the retirement age, dismissal of temporary workers, elimination 
of ghost workers, and a recruitment freeze. It was only in those cases where 
such measures had a meagre impact on the budget that retrenchment of civil 
servants was actually enforced. Even then, it proved extremely difficult to 
implement the retrenchment programme. In Tanzania, for instance, the 
government decided to retrench 27,000 civil servants in 1985. But in that 
same year, a new Ministry of Local Government was created. As a result, 
less than half of the intended number of workers was actually laid off. In 
Ghana, generous severance payments made retrenchment prohibitive, 
particularly in state enterprises. 
Recent experience points to considerable difficulties in reducing employ-
ment levels in the public sector. Difficulties stemmed either from political or 
budgetary sources. The furthest governments seem to be willing to go is to 
impose a recruitment freeze. Recruitment was frozen in non-essential public 
services in Benin, the Gambia, Mauritania, Sierra Leone, Somalia and 
Tanzania.18 Guaranteed employment schemes for graduates have also been 
discontinued in several countries, including Benin, the Central African 
Republic, Congo, Guinea, Mali, Rwanda, Somalia and the Sudan.19 Kenya 
announced a similar measure in 1986, although it has remained a dead letter 
so far. 
The results emerging from existing redeployment programmes indicate 
that only a minute fraction of the retrenched workers have become 
successful micro-entrepreneurs. Because of pressing social and material 
needs, severance payments20 have seldom been invested in income 
generating activities. Evidence from Burkina Faso and Gabon, for instance, 
shows that most of the workers who had benefited from redeployment 
programmes joined the ranks of job seekers after one or two years. Such 
discouraging results turn truly worrisome when one knows that 
redeployment programmes and national employment funds are increasingly 
being financed through international loans and credits, not through grants. 
Some countries, however, have been able to sustain relatively high levels 
of growth in public sector employment. In Kenya, for example, public sector 
employment continued to grow at the annual rate of 4.2 per cent between 
1980 and 1989. In Burkina Faso, civil service employment increased at 5.4 
per cent per annum between 1986 and 1989. The fastest growing sub-sectors 
are the basic social services. The number of teachers in Kenya, for instance, 
increased at an annual rate of 7.6 per cent per annum between 1982 and 
1989. Although the growth rate was inflated because of the implementation 
of a new educational system, it should not be considered particularly 
excessive. If the basic objective is to sustain the provision of basic social 
services to a rapidly increasing population, then employment in those 
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services should keep pace. Indeed, in a situation where the number of 
children of school-going age is increasing at 4.7 per cent a year—as was the 
case in Kenya during the 1980s21—it would be unreasonable to advocate a 
recruitment freeze for teachers if one does not want the quantity or quality of 
education to decline further. 
IV. Informal-sector employment 
The informal sector is increasingly becoming the employer of last resort in 
urban Africa. Since the modern sector absorbs only a minute fraction of the 
newcomers to the urban labour market, the overwhelming majority of the in-
cremental urban labour force must necessarily be absorbed in the informal 
sector. It is estimated that the informal sector created some 15 million new 
jobs during the 1980s in the region. In contrast, the urban modern sector 
added only an estimated one million new jobs. Approximately 61 per cent of 
the urban labour force are currently employed in the informal sector. The re-
mainder are either employed in the modern sector (21%) or unemployed 
(18%). The informal sector is clearly playing the role of urban labour 
sponge. Knowing that about a quarter of the regional labour force is 
urbanized and that two-thirds of all wage employment is in urban areas, we 
11 can expect that a staggering 93 per cent of all additional jobs in urban Africa 
will need to be generated by the informal sector during the 1990s. 
The activities of the majority of micro-enterprises are trade-related, while 
only a small percentage belong to the services and manufacturing sub-
sectors. A 1988/89 survey of the informal sector in Dakar revealed that 72 
per cent of the enterprises were in commerce, while the other 28 per cent 
were in production, building trades, transport and services.22 This distinction 
is important because the potential for productive employment in services and 
manufacturing enterprises is much larger than that in trading activities. The 
Dakar survey found that the average size of an enterprise in commerce was 
only 1.1, compared to 3.0 in building and construction, 4.4 in services and 
4.5 in production activities. 
Access to self-employment in commerce is easiest in terms of experience, 
skills, and capital. Therefore, informal enterprises in the trading sector 
usually consist of one-man ventures. Micro-enterprises in services and 
manufacturing activities, on the other hand, are usually larger, employing 
between three and five persons. Access to self-employment in those 
activities is much more difficult and requires—besides experience, skills and 
capital—a high degree of maturity, a fixed location and permanent 
structures. It is therefore not surprising that most micro-entrepreneurs in 
those two sub-sectors are well over 30 years of age.23 
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The belief is widespread that unemployed youth can easily be settled into 
self-employment in the informal sector. However, access differs greatly ac-
cording to the type of activity. As was pointed out, access in terms of the re-
quired attributes is relatively easy in commerce, while it is quite demanding 
in production activities. Most youngsters employed in petty trading consider 
their job temporary. They all aspire to become self-employed in more 
productive and remunerative activities. Alas, there is a gulf between their 
aspirations and viable business opportunities. 
There seems to be a gap of approximately 15 years between the moment 
the school leaver joins the labour market and the moment he or she becomes 
a micro-entrepreneur in the services or manufacturing sector. During that 
period of time, the would-be entrepreneur acquires the necessary attributes 
for gaining access to the most productive parts of the informal sector. The 
road to self-employment in those activities is thus long and tortuous. The gap 
of 15 years is filled with periods of apprenticeship, formal and informal 
sector wage employment, petty trading, and spells of unemployment. 
Evidence contradicts the prevailing assumption that the majority of the ur-
ban labour force will be self-employed in the future. Indeed, censuses and 
surveys indicate that the chief employment status in urban centres is not self-
employment but wage employment. A census of Dar es Salaam residents 
undertaken in 1984 found that only one-third of the employed population 
was working for own account. The remaining two-thirds had an employee 
status. Similarly, the 1984 population census in Ethiopia revealed that only 
26.3 per cent of the Addis Ababa working population had the status of either 
employer or own account worker. Over two-thirds (69.7%) of the employed 
population worked for pay. The remaining 4.0 per cent consisted of unpaid 
family workers and apprentices. The results of the 1985 living standard 
survey in Cote d'lvoire confirm these observations.24 As much as 71.8 per 
cent of the households in Abidjan obtained income from wages and salaries. 
Two-thirds of them were said to earn only wage incomes. The other third 
earned income from both wage and self-employment. In contrast, only 23.7 
per cent reported receiving income solely from self-employment. The 
remaining 4 per cent did not earn any income. Figure 3 depicts the 
composition of the urban and rural employed workforce by employment 
status. 
Hence, the available information validates the argument that the majority 
of the urban labour force work for pay, not for profit.25 With the rapid urban-
ization of the labour force, this means that the importance of work for pay in 
the informal sector will increase over time. Therefore, it would be unrealistic 
to expect that most of the newcomers to the urban labour market will 
become self-employed. Youth face grave obstacles in gaining access to self-
employment outside petty trading because they lack the necessary maturity, 
skills, experience and financial resources to start and run their own business. 
As in most urban economies, the principal employment status in urban 
Africa is—and will continue to be—wage employment, be it of a formal or 
informal nature. 
12 
Figure 3 Workforce by employment status 
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This is not to dismiss the importance of activities that aim at developing 
an entrepreneurial spirit among the youth. Such activities will have to play a 
greater role in enhancing employment levels and alleviating poverty in the 
years to come. They will also be necessary to bring structural change into the 
informal sector. The centre of gravity of the informal sector needs to be 
moved away from the predominant commercial activities towards the more 
productive and better established parts of the sector. The so-called "missing 
middle" will need to be developed in the future, i.e. those types of 
enterprises that fall between the traditional informal sector and the small-
scale formal sector. 
V. Rural employment 
Agriculture still represents the backbone of most Sub-Saharan economies. It 
remains the single most important sector and generates the bulk of non-oil 
export earnings (typically more than 80 per cent). It is also the most 
important employer. About three-quarters of the Sub-Saharan population 
derive their livelihood from agriculture. 
Small-scale agriculture in Africa is overwhelmingly subsistence-oriented. 
Food crops like maize, yams, millet, cassava and paddy occupy more than 
half of the total area planted. Farm holdings are quite small. The majority of 
farmers cultivate less than one hectare. It is therefore not surprising that a 
large proportion of them do not market any produce. Only a minority sell 
produce for an amount equivalent to the annual minimum wage. The average 
number of hours worked is usually high. The extent of visible under-
employment is often found to be lower than expected. Indeed, farmers work 
long hours to eke out a meagre living. The rural labour force survey in 
Kenya, for instance, revealed nearly full labour utilization. For the prime age 
group 25-64, the average farmer worked about 40 hours per week. There 
was no gender bias with respect to the length of time worked. The bias 
occurred in the type of activities. Men worked more for pay or profit outside 
the holding, especially in non-farm activities. Women worked more on the 
holding, particularly fetching water and collecting firewood. 
Another important characteristic of the rural labour market is the signifi-
cant proportion of peasant farmers reporting non-farm activities as their 
main source of cash income. In Cote d'lvoire, for instance, 12.4 per cent of 
the rural labour force was reported to be self-employed in non-farm activities 
in 1985. The main types of non-farm activities seem to be similar to those 
undertaken in the urban informal sector. The predominant activity is 
commerce. In Cote d'lvoire, less than 15 per cent of non-farm businesses 
were engaged in manufacturing. Food commerce accounted for half and non-
food commerce for a quarter of all non-farm activities. 
Although the importance of rural non-farm activities in terms of employ-
ment is difficult to quantify—because they are usually carried out as a sec-
ondary occupation—it can be safely assumed that their significance is 
increasing over time. Evidence contained in Table 2 clearly shows that rural 
households obtain a significant and growing proportion of their income from 
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sources other than farming. In Kenya, the relative importance of non-farm 
activities nearly doubled between the'mid- 1970s and the early 1980s. Their 
increased importance came about at the expense of farming activities, 
confirming a high level of labour utilization in the rural areas in that country. 
Table 2 Composition of rural household income in selected 
countries (%) 
C6te d'lvoire Ghana Kenya Lesotho Sudan 
Activity 1985 1988 1974/75 1981/82 1986 1978/80 
Farming 75.0 69.0 57.0 48.1 24.8 47.7 
Non-farm activities 13.3 16.0 9.7 16.9 6.0 
Salaries and wages 6.4 11.0 22.4 21.3 10.0 52.3 
Remittances & gifts 5.3 4.0 10.9 13.7 59.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Rural household budget surveys. 
The increased importance of non-farm activities as a source of 
employment and income in rural areas stems from the interplay of the 
following three factors: higher agricultural output and incomes; a shift in the 
consumption structure in favour of informal-sector goods and services; and 
the growing population pressure on arable lands. 
Improving agricultural production has been one of the key objectives of 
structural adjustment and economic recovery programmes. Agriculture has 
been the engine of growth of Africa's vulnerable recovery. As much as one-
half of the economic growth observed between 1980 and 1989 stemmed 
from agriculture.26 Moreover, agricultural growth was mainly food-crop-
driven, while export volumes of primary commodities declined throughout 
the 1980s 27 The major causes for the rapid growth in agriculture in recent 
years were good weather conditions, domestic trade liberalization, and more 
attractive producer prices. 
Real producer prices in most Sub-Saharan African countries bottomed out 
around the mid-1980s, after experiencing a steady decline in the 1970s and 
early 1980s. Agricultural producer prices increased more rapidly than wages 
and prices in general. Consequently, the long-term decline in the domestic 
terms of trade has been halted in most countries and reversed in some. This 
has undoubtedly improved the employment and earnings prospects in the 
rural sector. It has also led to a narrowing of the urban-rural income gap,28 
although the income concentration within the rural sector seems to be on the 
rise.29 
However, the recent slump in agricultural commodity prices on world 
markets is undoing most of the progress made in recent years. Producer 
prices of coffee and cocoa have recently been halved in several member 
countries of the Communaute financiere africaine (CFA countries). In non-
CFA countries, it is increasingly difficult to protect real producer prices of 
these tradeables through continued devaluation. Figure 4 displays the 
evolution in real producer prices for cocoa in two CFA countries and in two 
non-CFA countries. 
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Figure 4 Real cocoa producer prices in selected countries 
Index 1980-100 
— Cameroon C6te d'lvoire 
Index 1980-100 
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Source-. U N D P / W o r l d Bank (89) S EIU (90) 
EMPLOYMENT ISSUES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 17 
The prices are expressed in local currency and deflated by the consumer-
price index. The graph shows the drastic reduction in real producer prices 
that came in the wake of the recent collapse of world cocoa prices. In 
Cameroon and Cote d'lvoire, real producer prices dropped by 45 and 54 per 
cent, respectively, in 1989. Neither were Ghana and Nigeria able to insulate 
their farmers from the collapse of world prices. Real producer prices fell by 
16 and 36 per cent, respectively, in 1989, nullifying a major part of the 
progress achieved during the period 1984-1987. 
Recent experience confirms that in primary commodity exporting 
countries the internal terms of trade are not independent of international 
terms of trade. Together with the debt overhang, the present slump in world 
commodity prices seriously obstructs the successful implementation of 
structural adjustment programmes in the region. 
VI Unemployment 
So far our regional employment profile indicates that three-quarters of the 
labour force are employed in the rural sector, while the modern and informal 
sectors employ approximately 8 and 12 per cent, respectively. The remainder 
are classified as unemployed. 
The tendency toward mounting unemployment in the region is undeniable. 
Population censuses and labour-force surveys indicate high levels of unem-
ployment, especially in urban areas.30 In Zimbabwe, for instance, the urban 
unemployment rate was appraised at 18.3 per cent in 1986/87. In Kenya, the 
rate was reported at 16.2 per cent in 1986. In Dar es Salaam, it was reported 
that 21.6 per cent of the urban labour-force was out of work in 1984. In 
Sierra Leone, the urban unemployment rate was estimated at 14.8 per cent in 
1988. In Dakar, 17.3 per cent of the urban labour force was unemployed in 
1985. In Abidjan, 20.0 per cent was out of work in the same year. Table 3 
summarizes recent information concerning urban unemployment in the 
region. 
Table 3 Urban unemployment rates 
in selected countries 
Country Year rate(%) 
Botswana 1984/85 31.2 
C6te d'lvoire 1985 20.0 
Ethiopia 1981 23.0 
Kenya 1986 16.2 
Nigeria 1985 9.7 
Senegal 1985 17.3 
Sierra Leone 1988 14.8 
Somalia 1982 22.3 
Tanzania 1984 21.6 
Zambia 1986 19.0 
Zimbabwe 1986/87 18.3 
Source: National censuses or surveys 
The reference period is usually a week 
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Table 3 suggests that in the mid-1980s the urban unemployment rate in 
the region ranged between 15 and 20 per cent, up from approximately 10 per 
cent in the mid-1970s.31 This means that, in absolute terms, there were 
approximately 9 million urban unemployed in Sub-Saharan Africa in 1990. 
It is currently estimated that the unemployed urban population is increasing 
at 10 per cent a year or more. This is considerably higher than the estimate 
of 6 per cent a year during the 1960s.32 
The unemployed in the region have two important characteristics: their 
youthfulness and their high level of education. A large proportion of the 
unemployed consist of young people aged between 15 and 24 years. 
Typically, the youth represent between two-thirds and three-quarters of the 
unemployed population, although they account for only a third of the 
regional labour force. Their unemployment rate is universally higher than 
that for any other labour-force category. Figure 5 indicates that youth 
unemployment rates are considerably higher than adult unemployment rates. 
The countries included in the graph are Cote d'lvoire (1985), Ethiopia 
(1984), Kenya (1986), Nigeria (1985), Sierra Leone (1985) and Zimbabwe 
(1986/87). Based on information for 15 Sub-Saharan African countries, 
youth unemployment rates are about three times higher than adult 
unemployment rates. Youth unemployment rates of 30 per cent or more are 
not uncommon in the region, as is shown in Figure 5. 
Figure 5 Youth & adult unemployment rates 
Data tor mid-19G0o 
Source: U rban Survoya 
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It is important to determine whether youth unemployment is a transient 
problem or whether it is a sign of an emerging structural imbalance on the 
African labour markets. Available evidence supports both interpretations. On 
the one hand, data confirm that unemployment rates decline as one moves 
higher in the age pyramid of the labour force. This confirms the 
"employability-gap" thesis according to which youth are more vulnerable to 
unemployment because they lack sufficient maturity, work experience and 
social contacts to be competitive on the labour market. In other words, 
unemployment is considered part of the normal socialization process of the 
youth. This thesis is supported by the data contained in Table 4 which show 
that unemployment rates for adolescents (15-19 years) and young adults 
(20-24 years) are markedly higher than those for the adult labour force. 
Table 4 Urban unemployment rates by age in selected 
countries (%) 
Age Nigeria Kenya' 
Group 1974 1983 1978 1986 
15-19 20.7 47.2 26.6 36.2 
20-24 11.4 28.0 18.5 29.2 
25-29 4.9 2.7 4.8 8.6 
30-34 1.8 2.2 2.0 3.7 
35-39 1.4 1.7 1.8 2.1 
40-44 3.0 0.8 0.7 0.7 
45-49 1.2 0.0 1.1 2.0 
50-54 0.9 1.3 1.4 0.9 
55-59 0.0 2.7 1.5 4.1 
60-64 0.0 - 3.2 0.0 
65+ 0.0 - 2.2 -
All 6.2% 7.3% 6.7% 9.7% 
Source: Urban labour force surveys. 
"Based on a single day reference period 
However, Table 4 also suggests that youth are particularly vulnerable to 
rising unemployment. Youth unemployment rates increased rapidly between 
the mid-1970s and mid-1980s, while adult unemployment rates remained 
virtually unchanged. It was the educated youth in particular who suffered 
from increased unemployment. Contrary to the situation in the industrial 
countries—where the lack of education and training constitutes the major 
characteristic of the unemployed youth—educated youth in Africa are more 
prone to unemployment than uneducated youth. Unemployment seems to be 
positively correlated with the level of education. Typically, the 
unemployment rate by level of education follows an inverted U shape. 
Evidence from seven countries (shown in Table 5) indicates that the 
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unemployment rate is relatively low for the workforce without any formal 
education, increases for those with primary education, peaks for those with 
lower secondary education, and declines for upper secondary and university 
graduates. 

























None 1.0 9.2 3.4 13.5 13.5 2.5 1.6 
Primary 5.2 7.3 - - 28.8 5.2 6.8 
Lower level - - 5.2 14.5 - - -
Upper level - - 7.6 15.6 - - -
Secondary - - 13.5 - 36.8 30.5 11.6 
Lower level 21.7 8.4 - 22.2 - - -
Upper level 11.7 20.8 - 8.2 - - -
Tertiary 13.7 4.4 14.7 5.4 13.2 5.2 -
Total 3.7 10.5 5.5 16.2 22.8 9.7 7.2 
Source: National labour force surveys and population censuses. 
Secondary-school leavers constitute the labour force category for which 
unemployment is increasing fastest. In urban Kenya, for example, 55 per 
cent of the unemployed had completed secondary education in 1986, 
compared to 30 per cent in 1977/78. In Zimbabwe, 54 per cent of the 
unemployed population had post-primary education in 1986/87. In Nigeria, 
the proportion of the unemployed with secondary education increased from 
24 to 51 per cent between 1974 and 1985. On average, the share of the 
unemployed population with secondary education doubled between the mid-
19708 and the mid-1980s. At present, they account for more than half of all 
unemployed people. 
Furthermore, results from recent labour-force surveys contradict the thesis 
that educated people are unemployed not because they are educated but 
because they are young. The cross-classification of the unemployed by age 
and level of education shows that the relative vulnerability of youth to 
unemployment is not independent of the level of education. This 
classification is available from the Botswana and Kenya labour force 
surveys. Figure 6 reveals that the relative vulnerability of youth to 
unemployment is positively related to the level of education. Youth 
unemployment rates by level of education follow the same inverted U 
pattern noted earlier. Among Botswana and Kenyan youth, unemployment 
increases up to the level of lower secondary education, after which it 
declines. 
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Figure 6 Youth unemployment rates by level of education 
Data tor m l d - 1 9 B 0 e 
Source: National Suiveyi 
It is worth mentioning that unemployment is gradually creeping up the 
educational ladder. In the 1970s, primary-school leavers constituted the bulk 
of the unemployed. More recent evidence indicates that secondary-school 
leavers came to represent the majority of the unemployed during the 1980s. 
In the 1990s, unemployment among graduates is likely to skyrocket. Indeed, 
recent studies show that graduates are already experiencing growing 
difficulties on the labour markets. So far, the large majority of university 
graduates have been recruited by the public sector. But many governments in 
the region are abandoning the policy of guaranteed employment for 
graduates, hence the number of unemployed graduates is bound to increase 
dramatically during this decade. 
As an initial reaction, several countries have put the brake on the rate of 
expansion of tertiary enrolment. Some countries have even reduced their 
university population in absolute numbers. Nevertheless, it has proven 
extremely difficult to limit the social demand for secondary and tertiary 
education. Figure 7 illustrates this point. It shows the growth rates in 
enrolment by level of education for the period 1965-1988. The growth rates 
increased at all levels in the 1960s and 1970s, and peaked during the 
quinquennium 1975-1980. However, growth decelerated dramatically 
during the quinquennium 1980-1985 and fell further in the period 1985-
1988. It also shows how post-primary education weathered the crisis of the 
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1980s better than primary education. Primary enrolment growth fell below 
the population growth rate, leading to a decline in the enrolment ratio. Post-
primary enrolment growth decreased as well but remained above the 
population growth rate, except at the secondary level after 1985. These 
trends imply that the level of qualifications of the output of the education 
system in the 1990s will remain relatively high, despite decelerating 
enrolment growth. The higher the level of education of the school leavers, 
the higher their job aspirations, and the more likely that they will join the 
queue in the prolonged search for non-available jobs. In short, graduate 
unemployment looms as a major labour-market issue during the 1990s. 
Figure 7 Growth in school enrolment by level of education 
A n n u a l ave rages lor s u b - S a h a r a n A f r i c a 
65-70 70-75 75-80 80-85 85-88 
• PRIMARY C D SECONDARY 
Source: UNESCO (1983 & 1990) 
TERTIARY 
But high unemployment among the educated youth can partly be 
explained by the possession of a school certificate. It raises expectations that 
make youngsters withhold their labour while they queue for a white-collar 
job. Over time, however, they lower their job aspirations and reservation 
wage and are eventually absorbed in the labour market. Hence, educated 
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unemployment may result from a static urban labour market which is 
characterized by a relatively high wage differential on the combined primary 
and secondary job markets. This would make extended periods of job 
seeking an economically rational choice from the private point of view. It is 
noteworthy that private benefits stemming from education have diminished 
over the past decade through direct labour-market intervention (recruitment 
freeze, declining salaries, compression in the wage structure, cuts in fringe 
benefits, etc.). Nevertheless, demand for white-collar jobs remains extremely 
high. Is this because social preferences are hard to change, or because a job 
in the modern sector, however lowly paid, still represents a profitable choice 
because of the access it gives to the secondary job market? 
VII. Wages and salaries 
Faltering wage employment growth has been accompanied by a sharp fall in 
real wages. Most commonly, wage cuts have been administered through 
inflationary erosion. Of the 28 Sub-Saharan African countries for which 
recent data are available, only one reported a modest increase in real wages. 
The other 27 countries all registered considerable losses. On the average, 
real wages declined by approximately 30 per cent between 1980 and 1986. 
Minimum wages also followed a downward trend during the 1980s. In a 
sample of 29 countries, 25 saw their real minimum wage eroded between 
1980 and 1986. On average, the real minimum wage fell by 20 per cent over 
that period. 
Wage erosion has been more pronounced in the public sector than in 
private enterprises. Very often, reductions in the public wage bill have been 
one of the major targets of structural adjustment programmes. The easiest 
way of achieving this target was through the implementation of wage freezes 
rather than recruitment freezes or retrenchment. These trends are confirmed 
by the results of a recent ILO survey of civil service pay in Africa33 which 
are depicted in Figure 8. Real starting salaries declined in all 14 countries 
surveyed.34 Among the countries where the purchasing power of the average 
civil servant underwent the least erosion were Togo, Mauritania and Kenya. 
The ones that experienced a virtual collapse of real wages included Somalia, 
Sierra Leone and Tanzania. The graph also exhibits a striking difference in 
wage trends between the lowest and highest grades. The starting salary in the 
highest grade decreased much faster in real terms than that in the lowest 
grade. Hence, the wage differential between the lowest and the highest grade 
narrowed considerably over the period of ten years, as is indicated in Table 
6. Of the 17 countries surveyed, 11 experienced a narrowing in their wage 
differential. On average, the wage differential between the highest and 
lowest grade declined by approximately a fifth, falling from 17.2 to 13.5 
between 1975 and 1985. 
The trend in real basic salaries does not, however, tell the full story. The 
incidence of normal increments, regular promotion and allowances should be 
incorporated in the analysis of real wage and salary trends. Robinson shows 
that increments did cushion the dramatic fall in basic salaries. 
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Table 6 The ratio of highest to lowest starting 
salary in selected civil services 
Country 1975 1985 Change 
(%) 
Benin 17.3 17.3 0.0 
C.A.R. 13.0 9.4 -27.7 
Chad 17.5 17.5 0.0 
Gambia 10.7 9.8 -8 .4 
Guinea 15.0 12.6 -16.0 
Kenya 28.0 32.4 15.7 
Mauritania 6.9 5.0 -27.5 
Niger 18.2 18.2 0.0 
Nigeria 19.4 10.1 47.9 
Sierra Leone 10.5 7.0 -33.3 
Somalia 8.2 6.9 -15.9 
Sudan 14.4 11.7 -18.8 
Tanzania 10.9 8.9 -18.3 
Togo 10.4 10.4 0.0 
Uganda 34.2 12.0 -64.9 
Zaire 16.7 25.0 49.7 
Zimbabwe 41.7 16.1 -61.4 
Average 17.2 13.5 -21.4 
Source: Robinson (1990), and Chew (1990). 
Based on a sample of 12 countries, the inclusion of normal increments 
reduced the fall in real salary by approximately a fifth. However, increments 
were far from compensating the decline in real starting wages. Promotions 
represent another way of compensation for real wage cuts. Evidence 
suggests that the number of promotions did indeed increase during the 
1980s, especially for senior staff—the very people who suffered the deepest 
cuts in basic salaries. Nevertheless, regrading did not become a universally 
applied substitute for periodic salary revisions. The incidence of allowances 
is more difficult to assess. Cash allowances have normally declined over 
time, although they may have been allocated more frequently with real 
wages plummeting. Non-cash allowances, on the other hand, have kept up 
with inflation. Government accommodation, in particular, can represent a 
large proportion of the basic salary. For senior officials, such housing is 
often an important reason for remaining in the civil service, despite the 
dismally low wages. 
Although increments, promotions and allowances constitute an important 
part of the pay system, especially in the public sector of most Africa 
countries, evidence does not indicate that they were sufficient to compensate 
for the fall in basic salaries.36 Hence, basic salary trends can be considered 
as a good proxy for assessing the evolution in total earnings. 
In most countries, the dramatic fall in real wages occurred during the first 
half of the 1980s. Figures 9 and 10 show that this was the case for Sierra 
Leone, Kenya, Tanzania and Togo. Those countries experienced quite 
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different wage trends. The purchasing power of the minimum wage fell by 
20 per cent in Togo, by 40 per cent in Kenya, by 60 per cent in Tanzania, 
and by 80 per cent in Sierra Leone. Despite these marked differences, they 
all depict the same dramatic fall in the first half of the decade, followed by a 
period of relative stability in the second half of the 1980s. 
Figure 9 Real starting salary in the civil service of Sierra Leone 
Index 1978*100 
LOWEST GRADE HIGHEST GRADE 
Sourcej JA8PA (1990) 
Figure 10 Real minimum trends in selected countries 
Index 1980-100 
—— Kenya —— Tanzania ™— Togo 
Source: Government Publ lcet lone 
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The reason for the relative stability of wages in recent years is that they 
reached a subsistence minimum below which they could hardly be 
compressed any further. In Tanzania, for instance, the monthly minimum 
wage prevailing in 1989 could buy only 10kg of sembe (maize flour), 10kg 
of beans and 5kg of rice. This was hardly sufficient to sustain the worker's 
own health, let alone cover the basic needs of his family. Obviously, the 
minimum wage had fallen below the food-poverty line. Evidence from Sierra 
Leone shows a similar drop in the purchasing power of wages. In 1976/77 
the average household in Freetown needed the equivalent of two government 
minimum wages to satisfy its food requirements. By early 1990, the same 
household required not less than 17 government minimum wages to maintain 
the nutritional standards of 1976/77.37 
The observed wage declines were often steeper than the decline in per-
capita income in the region, suggesting that wage earners have shouldered 
the brunt of the crisis. Data from 11 countries confirm that their income 
position has worsened relative to that of other socio-economic groups. In the 
mid-1980s, an average-wage employee in the non-agricultural modem sector 
earned about three times the per-capita income, down from a ratio of more 
than 4 in 1975. The ratio dropped by 20 per cent in the first half of the 
1980s, against a decline of 10 per cent in the quinquennium 1975-1980. 
In short, a great deal of evidence points to the existence of wage flexibility 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, the level of aggregation of the data is nor-
mally too high to allow for a detailed analysis of the degree of flexibility. 
Simple comparison of average wages can be very misleading indeed, 
because worker's characteristics do not remain constant over time. If one 
does not take into account the changes in wage-determining attributes of the 
workforce (such as skills, experience, age, gender and sectoral distribution), 
average wage trends may give a very distorted picture. The danger of the 
fallacy of the mean is documented in a detailed study on Cote d'lvoire.38 
Between 1979 and 1984, a period of intense recession in the country, the 
average real wage increased by 17.5 per cent. Hence, aggregate data would 
seem to confirm the existence of wage rigidities in the system, allegedly 
explaining the important employment losses in the modem sector mentioned 
earlier. But the increase in the average real wage stemmed entirely from an 
upward trend in the skill composition of the workforce. As lay-offs affected 
mostly the lower skill categories, the average skill profile of the employed 
population increased during the years of crisis. Although most individual 
wages decreased in real terms, the aggregate wage increased. After 
controlling for the changing skill composition, the average real wage fell by 
8 per cent over the period. The results of the ILO study on civil service pay 
in Africa confirm that wages have often been more flexible than the average 
figures suggest at first glance. 
Real earnings have fallen below their "efficiency level" in several 
countries. They often need to be supplemented by other income sources. 
Modern-sector employees are forced to seek other income sources— 
including urban farming and informal activities—to compensate for the 
calamitous drop in real earning. Moonlighting39 and job multiplicity among 
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\ modern sector wage earners became the rule in many countries. The extent 
of labour-market fusion remains a point of discussion, primarily because of 
the lack of reliable quantitative information. Although the phenomenon is 
certainly growing, its importance should not be exaggerated because certain 
pre-conditions have to be fulfilled before one can gain access to a 
remunerative second job. Indeed, it requires land, capital and skills before a 
modern-sector wage employee can set up a micro-business. Therefore, the 
higher the income and/or skill level of the wage employee, the more likely 
he or she will obtain secondary income from formal and/or informal sector 
activities.40 
Evidence from Cote d'lvoire supports this a priori thinking.41 
"Sunlighting" in that country was found to be more prevalent among civil 
servants than among private-sector wage earners. This is probably related to 
the fact that the former can easily reduce their labour input into the primary 
job.42 Double jobbing was more prevalent among male employees. Females 
represented 14 per cent of all moonlighters, against 27 per cent for non-
moonlighters. The number of years of schooling was also found to be 
considerably higher for moonlighters. The most important characteristic of 
moonlighting civil servants was that they earned on the average 47 per cent 
more in their primary job than non-moonlighters. Hence, the argument that 
widespread moonlighting will automatically cushion the social impact of 
wage cuts is doubtful. Access to supplementary sources of income very often 
depends on the position one occupies in the modern sector. This does not 
mean that adaptive responses to falling real wages do not occur at the lower 
end of the income scale. They undoubtedly do, but to a much lesser extent 
because of the relative lack of professional skills, financial resources and 
social contacts. 
Wage erosion and compression had a deleterious effect upon the 
efficiency, morale and motivation of the civil service.43 The civil service has 
virtually collapsed in several countries. Governments are becoming 
increasingly unable to fulfil essential development tasks because they lack a 
normally operating civil service. As long as civil servants—especially those 
at the senior level—remain preoccupied with their individual survival 
mechanisms, it would be illusory to expect the civil service to improve its 
capacity for policy analysis; and the design, formulation and implementation 
of reform packages. Nevertheless, the success of future recovery and 
adjustment programmes will critically depend on die internalization of those 
very capabilities. 
VIII. Employment projections 
for the 1990s 
The economic outlook for Africa is gloomy. The latest World. Development 
Report forecasts an economic growth rate that will hardly exceed the popula-
tion growth rate during the period 1989-2000. This means that per-capita in-
come will, at best, stagnate at the current depressed level. Throughout the 
1980s, economic growth has remained below the demographic rate of 
growth. 
Our employment projections for the 1990s are based on the World 
Development Report 1990 which projects a Sub-Saharan economic growth 
rate of 3.7 per cent a year. We estimate the annual rate of growth at 3.0 per 
cent for the modern sector, 4.0 per cent for the rural (farm and non-farm) 
sector, and 4.5 per cent for the informal sector. Assuming an annual increase 
of 1 per cent in labour productivity for the urban sector and a 1.5 per cent 
increase for the rural sector—to allow for a modest increase in labour 
incomes and a narrowing in the urban-rural productivity gap44—it is possible 
to project sectoral employment growth for the next decade. The indicative 
figures are given in Table 7.45 
Table 7 Employment projections for Sub-Saharan Africa (millions) 
Sector 1990 Output 
(%) 




Rural 143.6 4.0 1.5 2.5 183.8 
Informal 30.5 4.5 1.0 3.5 43.2 
Modern 15.9 3.0 1.0 2.0 19.4 
Unemployed 9.0 - - 27.9 
Labour force 199.1 3.7 1.3 2.4 274.3 
Source: Table 1, World Bank (1990) and own estimations. 
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Productive employment is projected to increase at 2.4 per cent per annum, 
while the regional labour force is projected to expand by 3.3 per cent. Hence, 
the employment situation is likely to deteriorate further during the 1990s. 
Employment will expand fastest in the informal sector (3.5% p.a.), followed 
by the rural sector (2.5% p.a.), and the modem sector (2.0% p.a.). By the end 
of the century, modem wage employment is unlikely to account for more 
than 7 per cent of the Sub-Saharan labour force. The two most important 
labour sponges during the 1990s will continue to be the rural and informal 
sectors, generating 71 and 23 per cent respectively, of all productive new 
jobs. The modern sector is unlikely to generate more than 6 per cent of new 
jobs. 
The projected employment growth for the rural sector exceeds the 
projected labour force growth of 2.2 per cent per annum.46 Hence, the full 
realization of the growth potential of the rural sector will require a reduction 
in the rural exodus. The rural world will indeed need to retain more of its 
young and educated workforce if agricultural productivity and production 
are to increase simultaneously.47 
The urban unemployed population is expected to triple over the next 
decade, rising from 9 to 28 million people. Ceteris paribus, the urban 
unemployment rate will increase from 18 to 31 per cent. Of course, most of 
the unemployment will be converted into under-employment through 
continued work-sharing, especially in the informal sector.48 This will 
inevitably preclude productivity gains and lead to an aggravation of the 
poverty situation. 
Figure 11 depicts the estimated employment structure for the years 1980 
and 1990 as well as the projected structure for the year 2000. 
Figure 11 Sectoral employment structure (estimated and projected) 







K Z RURAL 
IINF*UNEMP 
MODERN 
1980 1990 2000 
Source: Ae In table 7 
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The salient feature is that the category of informal sector employment and 
unemployment49 is becoming increasingly important, rising from 12 per cent 
in 1980 to 20 and 26 per cent in 1990 and 2000, respectively. Over the 
period, the proportion of the labour-force employed in the rural sector will 
decline from three-quarters to two-thirds, while the share employed in the 
modern sector will decrease from 10 to 7 per cent. 
XL Conclusions 
The dramatic economic setbacks that beset Sub-Saharan Africa during the 
1980s had a devastating impact on the labour market situation. The major 
symptoms of the crisis included increased urban female labour force partici-
pation, stagnating employment in the modem sector, wage erosion, compres-
sions in the wage structure, widespread "sunlighting", mounting youth 
unemployment, and the saturation of the informal and agricultural labour 
sponges. Informalization was perhaps the most marked feature of the sub-
Saharan labour market during the past decade. 
Falling real wages, compression in wage differentials, and the reallocation 
of labour to the rural and informal sectors could indicate that labour markets 
are functioning relatively well in the region. Indeed, there exists a large body 
of evidence suggesting that labour markets are flexible and do respond to in-
centives. In Kenya, for instance, the adoption in earnest of structural adjust-
ment in 1982 arrested the decline in large-scale agricultural wage 
employment and turned it into a robust and sustained growth. Moreover, 
agricultural wages increased much faster than construction wages, a typical 
non-tradeable sector. Evidence from Ghana indicates that the economic 
reform programme brought about a turnaround in the flows of rural-to-urban 
migration.50 
However, evidence that points to poorly operating labour markets is also 
available. The implementation of structural adjustment programmes in Cote 
d'lvoire, for example, led to an employment shift in favour of the non-trade-
able sector. Moreover, wage employment fell considerably despite a drop in 
real wages and the depreciation in the currency.51 In TOgo, the tradeable sec-
tor suffered greater employment losses than the non-tradeable sector during 
the period 1980-1988. In Mauritius, the successful implementation of struc-
tural adjustment did not bring about noticeable labour migration among sec-
tors. 
On balance, the evidence remains inconclusive. In some cases, labour 
markets did respond to incentives and market forces. In other cases, they did 
not, or only did so to a lesser extent. This underscores the many complexities 
that are involved in determining flexibility and mobility on the labour 
market, and hence the need for intensifying country-specific research on the 
structure and behaviour of the labour market. 
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This paper has reviewed the salient features of the behaviour and structure 
of the Sub-Saharan labour market. Its basic conclusion is that labour-market 
issues need to be better integrated in the new generation of structural 
adjustment programmes. The first generation focused attention on the 
provision of incentives in the product and capital markets. They largely 
ignored the labour market. The basic assumption was that lower labour costs 
would automatically lead to higher employment levels because of the 
downward-sloping demand curve for labour. But the evidence of the 1980s 
does not support this. Despite downward wage flexibility, there are no signs 
of renewed employment growth. Instead, we learnt that the neglect of the 
employment and labour income aspects had a negative impact on the 
sustainability of the adjustment process. The challenge that lies ahead is to 
better integrate labour-market dimensions into comprehensive programmes 
of policy reforms. 
Therefore, the research agenda of the African Economic Research 
Consortium needs to reflect the multi-dimensional nature of tomorrow's ad-
justment programmes without, however, diluting its focus. Although we do 
not wish to recommend the introduction of a new research topic, we strongly 
believe that the labour-market dimension constitutes an issue of growing 
policy relevance. For that reason, labour-market issues should become an 
integral part of the Consortium's research agenda. This could best be 
realized by exploring linkages with ongoing research areas. For instance, the 
emphasis on tradeables in general and export crops in particular has far-
reaching implications for labour reallocation in the economy,52 raising 
important questions about excess labour supply in rural areas, availability of 
appropriate skills, adequate incentives, back-to-the-land migration, etc. 
Another important issue relates to the fusion of labour markets. Fusion 
reduces the degree of labour mobility in the system, while falling real wages 
partly result from relative labour immobility. Hence, there seems to be a 
vicious circle at work between low labour incomes, labour-market fusion, 
and lack of geographical and sectoral labour mobility. In the modem sector, 
we need to study more closely the impact of wage fixation. It would seem 
that the extremely low level of minimum wages critically undermines the 
argument that minimum wage setting introduces major distortions on the 
labour market.53 But why did wage employment stagnate despite falling 
wages and salaries? Wage erosion does not necessarily imply wage 
flexibility. In the midst of falling wages, the labour cost per unit of 
production can remain largely unchanged. Although most analysts agree that 
lower wages and salaries will not solve Africa's employment problem, we 
need to look more carefully at the real structure of labour costs (wage and 
non-wage costs). 
These are matters that need to be addressed more explicitly by the AERC-
researchers on a case-by-case basis. During the past few years, the 
discussion about the impact of stabilization-cum-adjustment programmes has 
all too often resulted in mutual recriminations among and between domestic 
and external forces. Of late, however, converging views are emerging. The 
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earlier controversies are gradually being replaced by a search for pragmatic 
solutions. There is a consensus that the 1990s should be the decade of 
human-centred development.54 However, this commendable objective will 
lose its credibility if adjustment programmes continue to ignore their bearing 
on the labour market. 
Notes 
1. See World Bank, 1989, p.42. 
2. For the other developing countries, the average demographic growth rate is only half 
as high. See United Nations, 1989. 
3. The activity rates pertain to the population aged 15 years or more, except for Kenya 
where it refers to the 15-64 age cohort—hence her slightly higher participation rates. 
4. The working-age population is defined as all persons aged 15 years and over. 
Although it is recognized that children do participate in the labour force, they 
normally do so after school or on weekends and holidays. For the majority, the 
primary activity is schooling. They must, therefore, be excluded from the labour 
force. Because of the extremely limited coverage of the formal social security system 
in the region, it is appropriate to leave the age bracket for the working population 
open-ended. 
5. Despite the increase in female labour force participation rates, they remain 
underestimated because labour-force surveys and national accounts take a rather 
restrictive definition of economic activity. Activities that are not monetized or do not 
involve market transactions are usually considered as non-economic personal 
activities. The exceptions are own-consumed agricultural production, water fetching 
and firewood collection. Since those activities are essentially rural, the narrow 
interpretation of the production boundary leads to a serious under-estimation of 
urban activity rates, particularly for women. Although statisticians are increasingly 
aware of those shortcomings, no adequate solution has yet been proposed to the 
problem of measuring non-market production activities of urban households. For a 
fuller discussion of the topic see Goldschmidt-Clermont, 1990. 
6. See Government of Zimbabwe, 1989. 
7. See Government of Kenya, 1986 and 1988. 
8. See ILO/JASPA, forthcoming. 
9. Compelling evidence that education has a positive effect on women's labour force 
participation is summarized by Psacharopoulos and Tzannatos, 1989. 
10. The term "survival strategy" is considered less appropriate because it implies that the 
urban poor have a choice in adjusting their income sources. Most urban poor, 
however, do not have any degrees of freedom in coping with the crisis. The 
overwhelming majority of women are forced to eke out a living in low-productivity 
activities in order to contribute to the survival of the household. 
11. Between 1975 and 1990, the female gross enrolment ratio in the region is estimated 
to have increased from 53.9 to 72.6 at the primary level, from 7.7 to 18.6 at the 
secondary level, and from 0.4 to 1.1 at the tertiary level (UNESCO, 1990). Sub-
Saharan Africa is approximated by "Africa excluding Arab States" as defined in the 
UNESCO statistical yearbook. 
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12. This rate is slightly higher than the population growth rate because of the increased 
female labour force participation rate. 
13. See Vandemoortele, forthcoming, table 7. 
14. See Robinson, 1990, p.10. 
15. See Starr, 1988. 
16. Data for Sub-Saharan Africa indicate that the central government wage bill increased 
in real terms by only 5 per cent between 1980 and 1987, while total government 
expenditure rose by 23 per cent. Hence, the share of wages and salaries in total 
government expenditure declined considerably during the 1980s. See UNDP/World 
Bank, 1989, table 4 -24 . 
17. For a fuller discussion on this topic, see Nunbergy, 1989. 
18. See van Ginneken, 1990. 
19. Ibid. 
20. Severence payments can be quite generous. In Guinea, for example, they were 
equivalent to 60 monthly salaries. In Gabon they reached, in some cases, the level of 
9 million CFA (about US$36,000) . Severance payments are normally determined by 
two variables, namely the salary level and seniority. 
21. The child population aged 5 - 1 4 in Sub-Saharan Africa is projected to grow at 3.3 per 
cent a year during the 1990s. See United Nations, 1989. 
22. See Lubell and Zarour, 1990. 
23. See ILO/JASPA, 1989, table III.5. 
24. See Kozel, 1990. 
25. The chief employment status in the rural areas, on the other hand, is se l f -
employment. 
26. The other half stemmed essentially from the tertiary sector, while the process of de-
industrialization continued with the industrial sector contracting by 0 .2 per cent per 
annum. See World Bank, 1990. 
27. Ibid. 
28. See Jamal and Weeks, 1988. 
29. See Cornia and Strickland, 1990. 
30. Unemployment rates are markedly higher in urban centres compared to rural areas. 
The recent rural labour force survey in Kenya, for instance, reports very l o w 
unemployment rates. In 1988/89, the rural unemployment rate stood at the negligible 
level of 0.3 per cent. In Nigeria, urban and rural unemployment were estimated at 9.7 
and 3.0 per cent, respectively, in 1985. In Zimbabwe, they were reported at 18.3 and 
2.9 per cent, respectively, for 1986/87. In 1984, 22 per cent of the residents in urban 
Dar es Salaam were out of work, compared to 6 per cent in rural Dar es Salaam. 
31. Recent evidence challenges the ealier v iew that " . . . for what the available data are 
worth they show constancy in [unemployment] rates rather than any general 
tendency for rates to increase" (Turnham, 1971). 
32. See Berry and Sabot, 1984. 
33. See Robinson, 1990, p. 133. 
34. The only country where an increase in the starting salary was observed w a s 
Zimbabwe (not shown in the graph). The real starting salary in the lowest grade 
increased by 50.6 per cent between 1975 and 1985, but fell by 41 .9 per cent in the 
highest grade. 
35. The ratio remained constant in four Francophone countries, namely Benin, Chad, 
Niger and Togo. The ratio increased in only two countries, Kenya and Zaire. In the 
former, new grades at the top end of the pay scale were introduced, bringing about an 
increase in the ratio. 
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36. "In many countries government workers have borne a larger than average share of 
the adjustment to deteriorating macro-economic conditions" (Lindauer et al., 1988). 
37. See ILO/JASPA, 1990. 
38. See Levy and Newman, 1989. 
39. "Sunlighting" is probably a more appropriate term to describe the phenomenon in the 
region as most moonlighting is done during normal working hours. 
40. The differential access to secondary jobs may explain why the compression in the 
wage structure has met with so little resistance. 
41. See van der Gaag et al., 1989. 
42. In Uganda, for instance, many civil servants reported working less than half a normal 
working day. See Chew, 1990. 
43. See Klitgaard, 1989. 
44. The productivity growth rates are to some extent arbitrary. But it is unanimously 
accepted that without marked improvements in productivity, development will not 
return to the region. 
45. The employment structure for 1990 is arrived at in the fol lowing manner. W e know 
that modern-sector wage employment accounts for approximately 8 per cent of the 
labour-force. The urban informal sector employs about 61 per cent of the urban 
labour-force. Unemployment is considered a purely urban phenomenon and is 
estimated at 18 per cent. Employment in the rural sector is calculated as the residual. 
46. See Table 1. 
47. The U N population projections by rural and urban location implicitly assume a rate 
of internal migration of approximately 1.3 per cent. This means that a startling 5 
million people in Sub-Saharan Africa are expected to migrate every year from rural to 
urban areas during the 1990s. 
48. During the 1980s, work-sharing made it possible for the majority of newcomers to 
the labour market to find employment despite the crisis, albeit at strongly reduced 
levels of income. 
49. The rationale for joining these two categories is the observed phenomenon of work-
sharing whereby urban unemployment is transformed into informal sector under-
employment. 
50. Accra now appears one of the major areas of supply of labour to the western region, 
the new area of cocoa production. 
51. See Levy and Newman, 1989. 
52. The production of export crops is usually more labour intensive than food crop 
production. 
53. The role o f minimum wage setting differs considerably between industrial and 
developing countries. In the former, they provide a socially acceptable standard of 
living for marginal workers, and minimum wages usually fall below 50 per cent of 
the average wage level. In developing countries, on the other hand, the minimum 
wage sets the trend for a broad category of workers. The minimum wage in those 
countries is often as high as three-quarters of the average wage. In other words, 
minimum w a g e fixation in industrial countries falls outside the realm of the wage 
policy, whereas it constitutes a pillar of the wage policy in developing countries. But 
the situation changed dramatically during the 1980s, particularly in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Minimum w a g e s are no longer a major instrument of the w a g e policy. 
Nowadays, they fol low rather than precede average wage trends. 
54. See U N D P , and World Bank, 1990. 
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